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ABSTRACT
When a good decision leads to a bad outcome, the experience of regret can bias
subsequent choices: people are less likely to select the regret-producing alternative a
second time, even when it is still objectively the best alternative (non-adaptive choice
switching). The first study presented herein showed that nearly half of participants
experiencing regret rejected a previous alternative they had recognized as the best
one, and chose a non-optimal alternative instead. The second study investigated
the mechanism underlying this bias, and results supported the hypothesis that this
non-adaptive choice switching is caused by inhibition of the previous decision (direct
effect of experienced regret), rather than by increased sensitivity to anticipated regret
in subsequent choices (indirect effect of experienced regret mediated by anticipated
regret).
Subjects Neuroscience, Psychiatry and Psychology
Keywords Regret, Decision-making, Choice switching, Disappointment, Decision bias
INTRODUCTION
Regret is an emotion with strong cognitive roots, based on a comparison between “what
is” and “what might have been,” that is, between the outcome we actually obtained and a
better outcome we would have obtained, had we chosen differently (Van Dijk & Zeelenberg,
2005). Regret happens: it is unavoidable. Indeed, how many of us have not wanted to just
kick ourselves, at least once, for something we did (or did not do)? When we look back and
see that things would have turned out better had we made a different choice, we frequently
experience this unpleasant emotion (Marcatto & Ferrante, 2012). In order to feel regret,
we do not need to actually observe that we could have obtained a better outcome; it is
sufficient to imagine it (Kahneman, 1995; Bar-Hillel & Neter, 1996). In decision-making
research, regret is usually differentiated from disappointment: Both are negative emotions
that arise from counterfactual comparison, but while regret results from a comparison
between an actual outcome and a better outcome that might have occurred had we made
a different choice, disappointment stems from comparing an obtained outcome with a
better outcome that might have occurred had we made the same choice. This distinction is
particularly relevant because these emotions have distinguishable behavioral consequences
for decision making (see, e.g., Van Dijk & Zeelenberg, 2002; Zeelenberg et al., 2000).
Why do we feel regret? Isn’t it useless to cry over spilled milk? It is generally assumed
that although painful, regret is functional because it helps us make better decisions.
According to the Regret Theory (Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982), we can anticipate
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the possible emotional consequences of our choices before we make them, and use these
anticipated emotions to guide our choices (Janis & Mann, 1977; Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov,
1999). Thus, fear of possible future regret let us usually avoid risky behaviors and painful
experiences (e..g., Zeelenberg, 1999a; Wright & Ayton, 2005). Moreover, experienced regret
(or retrospective regret) may help us to prevent similar mistakes in the future, since it
makes the mistakes more painful (Zeelenberg, 1999b; Saffrey, Summerville & Roese, 2008).
According to a popular quote, “Regret is insight that comes a day too late.” In fact, when
we think that we should have behaved differently, we learn something, for example that
we should avoid the restaurant that served bad food or that drinking too much has its
downsides. Thus, being able to look back on and evaluate our past choices allows us to
modify future behavior and presumably make better decisions.
Regret and adaptive choices
The idea of an adaptive role of the cognitive-based emotion of regret is supported by
many research findings. Many studies have shown that people are regret averse: they
spontaneously anticipate future regret and behave in ways that minimize the possibility
of experiencing this negative emotion, for example by avoiding risky choices (Richard,
Van der Pligt & de Vries, 1996; Wright & Ayton, 2005), or by avoiding feedback about
foregone alternatives (Larrick & Boles, 1995; Ritov, 1996; Zeelenberg et al., 1996; Hoelzl &
Loewenstein, 2005; Van de Ven & Zeelenberg, 2011).
Neuropsychological studies show that patients with selective lesions to the orbitofrontal
cortex, an area associated with the processing of counterfactual comparisons, perform
worse than controls in repeated gambling tasks, since they cannot learn from their prior
emotional experiences (Camille et al., 2004; Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 2007).
Recently, O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney (2014) investigated the development of regret
in children, and found that when children begin to experience regret (between the ages of 5
and 7 years), the quality of their subsequent decision making improves. The development
of regret allows children to learn from their previous choices and thus to make better
choices when faced with the same situation again, a behavior that the authors have termed
adaptive choice switching.
A similar regret-based learning process, called regret matching, has also been imple-
mented in algorithms used in game theory. According to this procedure, in repeated games
the player changes his current strategy for a foregone alternative that would have given
a higher payoff in the past (Hart & Mas-Colell, 2000; Hart, 2005; Marchiori & Warglien,
2008). Regret matching is a simple adaptive procedure, based only on comparison of the
realized payoff and the foregone payoffs, leading in the long run to a sophisticated solution
of the game (correlated equilibrium) (Coricelli, Dolan & Sirigu, 2007).
Non-adaptive choice switching
Is regret-induced choice switching always adaptive? What happens, for example, when
people experience regret following an optimal decision, and are faced with the same choice
again? When regret is the unfortunate consequence of a good decision, or when previous
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outcomes are not related to subsequent choices, switching choices blindly could lead to
biased decisions.
Do people actually make “bad decisions” as a consequence of regret? Some literature
findings suggest that this can happen. Preliminary evidence was observed in a study
conducted by Zeelenberg & Beattie (1997). In one of their experiments, participants played
two rounds of Ultimatum Game as offerers. After the first round, they were told that their
offer was either 2 Guilders or 10 Guilders higher than the responder’s minimal acceptable
offer. Participants discovering they had offered 10 Guilders too much experienced regret
and lowered their offer in the subsequent round thereby, even if they knew that they were
playing with a new responder, whose minimal acceptable offer could have easily differed
from the previous responder’s offer. Similar results were found also in neuroimaging
studies conducted by Bu¨chel, Brassen and colleagues (Bu¨chel et al., 2011; Brassen et al.,
2012) aimed at investigate the neural mechanisms for how missed opportunities influence
future choices. Their results showed that, in a sequential risk taking task, following a
missed opportunity (e.g., you would have obtained a higher gain, if you had risked more)
participants increased the risk taken in the next round, despite the fact that consecutive
rounds were explicitly independent, and this behavior was paralleled by signal changes in
the ventral striatum, a neural structure involved in regret processing.
Ratner & Herbst (2005) found another evidence for this effect. Their experiments were
based on a scenario methodology requiring participants to choose between two brokers,
one of whom was described as having a better success rate than the other. Obviously, most
participants chose the broker with the better success rate. Half of them were then informed
that the selected broker had succeeded, the others were told that their broker had failed,
and all of them were then asked to imagine which of the two brokers they would choose
the next time. Results showed that participants whose broker had failed regretted their
decision and reported a lower intention to select the same broker again, even if she still had
the best success rate.
Choice switching: experienced vs. anticipated regret
Since most studies investigating the behavioral consequences of regret have adopted
repeated gambling tasks involving many trials, it is usually difficult to disentangle the effect
of anticipated from experienced regret. Indeed, O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney (2014)
hypothesized two mechanisms that might explain the choice switching behavior. The first
one is a simple process, consisting in remembering that a particular option yielded a poor
result in the past, thus avoiding it when faced with the same choice again (direct effect
of experienced regret, henceforth direct effect). According to the alternative explanation,
the effect of experienced regret on subsequent choices is mediated by anticipated regret:
A recent experience of regret could prime the anticipation of regret in the following
choices, leading to increased regret aversion (indirect effect of experienced regret mediated
by anticipated regret, henceforth indirect effect). The finding that the same neural circuitry
mediates the experience of regret and its anticipation, emerged in brain imaging studies
(Coricelli et al., 2005), provide support for the latter hypothesis. On the other hand, in the
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O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney (2014) studies on regret in children provided evidence for
the direct effect mechanism: The authors found a choice switching behavior in children
who have already developed the ability to experience regret, but were still incapable of
anticipating it, thus showing that experienced regret can affect a future choice independent
of anticipated regret.
The current studies
On the basis of the aforementioned considerations, the present studies were aimed at (i)
providing further evidence of a non-adaptive choice switching behavior using real choices
(Study 1), and at (ii) trying to shed light in the process that underpin this bias, by using a
task in which the two hypothesized mechanisms (direct effect vs. indirect effect) would lead
to different behaviors (Study 2).
Both studies adopted the choice switching paradigm (O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney,
2014). Specifically, a first choice was followed by feedback about the respective outcomes of
the chosen and non-chosen alternatives. The aim was to induce either regret (i.e., you
obtained a bad outcome, and the non-chosen alternative would have been better) or
disappointment (i.e., you obtained a bad outcome and even the non-chosen alternative
would have produced the same outcome).1 Afterwards, a second choice was presented,
1 Disappointment is often induced
by showing the bad outcome only;
participants do not actually see what
the counterfactual outcome would have
been (e.g., Mellers, Schwartz & Ritov,
1999). We decided to also give partic-
ipants a feedback in disappointment
conditions, to avoid the possibility that
participants spontaneously produced
regret-inducing counterfactual thoughts
(e.g., “if only I had chosen differently, I
would have obtained a better outcome”).
either similar (Study 1) or different (Study 2) from the previous. Unlike previous studies
on experienced regret, this experimental design made it possible to disentangle the specific
effect of regret from a more general effect caused by disappointment for the negative
outcome. It was hypothesized that, if regret influences subsequent decisions, participants
who receive the regret feedback should switch from a good decision to a non-optimal one




A total of 105 students (70 women and 35 men; mean age= 22.2 years, SD= 3.25) from
Trieste University voluntarily participated in the study and were randomly assigned to
either the regret or disappointment condition. Participants were tested individually and
were advised about the data retained and that anonymity was fully ensured, no sensitive
data were collected.
Procedure
Participants played two rounds of a simplified computer-version of Blackjack against the
computer-played dealer. To increase overall motivation and involvement in the game,
each round had a 5-Euro prize. Before beginning the first round, participants received
instructions on Blackjack rules. Participants started playing by turning their initial two
cards face up, and then had to choose whether to take more cards or to stop, by pressing
two buttons labeled “draw” and “stop,” respectively. Both dealer’s initial cards were face
down, to prevent participants from using casino Blackjack strategies like basic (for a
review on the psychology of playing Blackjack, see Keren & Wagenaar, 1985). The game
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was rigged so that in the first round all participants received the same cards (a “2,” a “6”
and a picture card), thus achieving the score of 18. We assumed that participants would
have recognized that stopping was the optimal decision after having achieved the score
of 18. In any event, participants who decided to draw another card would receive an “8,”
losing the game thereby. The dealer played after the participants and won by scoring 19
(with a picture card and a “9”); all participants therefore lost. Participants who decided to
stop at “18” then received a feedback about what would had happened, had they chose to
take another card. 2 Participants in the regret condition were shown that they would have
2 Participants choosing to take another
card at “18” were not assigned to the
experimental conditions and did not
play the second round.
drawn a “2,” winning thereby with a score of 20 (regret feedback), while participants in
the disappointment condition were shown that they would have drawn an “8,” and that
they therefore would have lost anyway (disappointment feedback). Participants’ emotional
reactions were assessed with the Regret and Disappointment Scale (Marcatto & Ferrante,
2008), a six items scale measuring regret, disappointment and the intensity of negative
affect resulting from the bad outcome.
In the second round, participants achieved the score of 18 again, but this time with
different cards (an “8” and a picture card), and they once more had to choose to either take
another card or to stop. We therefore expected that, if previously experienced regret can
induce non-adaptive choice switching, participants in the regret condition would less likely
choose the optimal alternative (“to stop”) than the participants in the disappointment
condition would.
Results
In the first round of Blackjack, most participants (90 out of 105, 86%) decided to stop
after scoring 18. As hypothesized, participants correctly recognized that stopping was the
optimal decision. The data from the 15 participants who decided to take another card were
excluded from the analyses reported in the next section.
Emotional reaction ratings
As reported in Table 1, the two conditions induced similar levels of negative affect (t = .20,
df = 88, p = .84, d = 0.04), but different types of specific emotions: The regret score was
higher in the regret condition than in the disappointment condition (t = 7.80, df = 88, p<
.001, d = 1.65), and the disappointment score was higher in the disappointment condition
than in the regret condition (t = 4.98, df = 88, p < .001, d = 1.05). Due to the key role of
chance in Blackjack, high disappointment scores were expected for both conditions.
Second Blackjack round choices
In the second round, 44% (20 out of 45) of the regret condition participants decided to take
another card after having scored 18, whereas only 24% (11 out 45) of the disappointment
condition participants decided to do so (χ2(1,90) = 3.99, p< .05, Crame´r’s V = .210).
A logistic regression was then conducted to assess whether the participants’ choices
in the second round could be significantly predicted by the following variables: Type of
feedback (regret or disappointment), negative affect, regret score and disappointment
score. Since predictors were expected to be highly correlated, a stepwise method with
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Table 1 Mean emotional reaction ratings in the two experimental conditions. Ratings ranged from 1
to 7.
Regret condition Disappointment condition
Mean SD Mean SD
Negative affect 3.16 1.55 3.09 1.58
Regret score 3.21 1.50 1.31 0.63
Disappointment score 3.68 1.45 5.23 1.50
backward elimination was used. Regret score turned out to be the only significant
predictor, with higher regret scores being associated with an increased likelihood of
deciding to take another card (B= .45, Wald= 7.89, p< .01).3
3 Other predictors excluded from the
final regression model: Type of feedback
(Wald = .03, p = .87), negative affect
(Wald = 1.52, p= .22), disappointment
score (Wald = .20, p= .65).)
DISCUSSION
Nearly half of the regret condition participants, correctly stopping at the score of 18 in the
first round, switched their choice in the second round by deciding to take a further card,
whereas most disappointment condition participants once more decided for the optimal
alternative.
Our results therefore showed that choice switching can happen also following the
unfortunate failure of an optimal choice (non-adaptive choice switching). Most important,
choice switching turned out to be associated with the intensity of experienced regret, as
showed in the regression analysis. Thus, we could expect an even stronger effect in real-life




A total of 80 students (49 women and 31 men; mean age= 22.9 years, SD= 2.69) from
Trieste University, who did not previously take part in Study 1, participated voluntarily.
They were randomly assigned to three experimental conditions: control condition
(N = 25), regret condition (N = 28) and disappointment condition (N = 27). Participants
were tested individually and were advised about the data retained and that anonymity was
fully ensured, no sensitive data were collected.
Procedure
As in Study 1, participants played a first round of Blackjack with a 5-Euro prize and
received a feedback (regret or disappointment) about the previous choice (to take another
card or to stop at the score of 18). Afterwards, they played a round of Red & Black, a
simple computerized card game similar to the one proposed originally by Slovic (1966)
and used more recently in other studies (e.g., Fernandez-Duque & Wifall, 2007). In this
game, participants were presented 10 cards lying face down into two rows on the computer
screen, they were told there were nine red queens and a single black queen. Their task
consisted in deciding how many and which cards to turn face up, by mouse-clicking on
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the back of the cards, one by one: Every red queen increased their jackpot by 0.50 Euros,
but the black queen (the “disaster” card) resulted in a total loss and ended the game.
Participants could choose to finish playing and collect their jackpot at any moment by
pressing the “stop” button. To obviate the possibility of participants finding the black
queen too early on, the game was rigged to have the black queen appear only if participants
decided to continue the game until the eighth card.
Participants in the control condition played only Red & Black, without the previous
Blackjack round. Red & Black participants’ behavior was diagnostic of the underlying
regret mechanism. Differently from previous versions of this game used to investigate
the effects of missed opportunities (e.g., Bu¨chel et al., 2011; Brassen et al., 2012), our
participants were not forced to turn the cards sequentially; instead, they were free to
choose the cards in whatever order they preferred. Moreover, the position of the “disaster”
card was not shown after participants stopped. This means that in our version of the
game our participants should not feel regret for having missed the opportunity to gain
more (e.g., counterfactuals like “I could have turned two more cards safely” are very
unlikely). Thus, in this game the regret-minimizing behavior consists in stopping early,
to avoid receiving the “disaster” card. If regret influences subsequent choices by increasing
future regret aversion (indirect effect), participants in the regret condition should have
engaged in regret minimizing behavior, by deciding to stop after turning over fewer cards
than participants in the disappointment and control conditions. Alternatively, if regret
influences subsequent choices by inhibiting a previously selected option (direct effect),
regret condition participants were expected to avoid the decision causing regret in the
previous Blackjack round (i.e., stopping), to the extent that that they would have turned
over more cards than participants in the other conditions.
Results
Most participants in the first round of Blackjack (50 out of 55, 91%) decided to stop
after scoring 18. Thus, as in Study 1, participants correctly recognized this as the optimal
decision. Data from the 5 participants who decided to continue and take another card were
excluded from the analyses reported in the next section.
Choices in Red & Black
Table 2 shows the mean and the median number of cards turned over in Red & Black
for each of the three conditions. Data were analyzed using non-parametric tests, since
regret condition’s data were highly skewed. A Kruskal-Wallis test yielded a significant
difference among the three conditions (χ2(2,75) = 7.83, p = .02). Planned comparison
revealed that participants in the regret condition turned over significantly more cards
than participants in the disappointment condition (Mann–Whitney Z = 2.30, p = .02)
and participants in the control condition (Mann–Whitney Z = 2.53, p = .01) did,
with no significant difference, however, between disappointment and control condition
participants (Mann–Whitney Z = 0.41, p = .68). Moreover, more than half of the
participants in the regret condition (14 out of 25, 56%) lost the game by turning over cards
until arriving at the “disaster” card (card nr. 8), whereas only 20% of the participants in
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Table 2 Mean and median of number of cards turned over in Red & Black in each of the three
conditions.
Mean SD Median
Control 6.04 1.37 6
Disappointment 6.24 1.20 6
Regret 7.04 1.31 8
the other two conditions (5 out of 25 in both the control and disappointment conditions)
continued until the eighth card.
Discussion
Without a prior experience of regret (control and disappointment conditions), in the Red
& Black game participants tended to stop after turning over approximately 6 cards; this
behavior was not far from the game’s actual optimal strategy (maximum expected value at
5 cards). Participants with a previous experience of regret (regret condition), however, de-
cided to turn over more cards, and 56% of these lost the game by turning over eight cards.
This result has multiple implications. Firstly, a non-adaptive choice switching behavior
induced by regret was once again confirmed. Secondly, this effect was not found to be
domain-specific, thus regret experienced after a decision task can influence people’s
behavior in a different subsequent task (see also Creyer & Ross, 1999; Raeva, Mittone &
Schwarzbach, 2010). Thirdly and most importantly, these findings support the hypothesis
of a direct effect of experienced regret on subsequent choices: Regret leads to the rejection
of the decision that previously resulted in a bad outcome. Thus, people are less likely to
make this decision again in a subsequent choice, and this could happen regardless of its
likelihood of success.
CONCLUSIONS
Research has demonstrated that people try to avoid future experiences of regret by opting
for behavior and choices that minimize the possibility of feeling this negative emotion
(see, e.g., Simonson, 1992; Beattie et al., 1994). Yet, things do not always go as planned, and
regret is unfortunately a common and somewhat painful experience that can influence
future behavior: People are less likely to once more opt for a decision that previously led to
regret, and will conversely select other alternatives. This behavior has been termed adaptive
choice switching, since it is usually functional, allowing people to learn from their previous
mistakes and decreasing the probability of repeating negative outcomes (Baumeister et
al., 2007; Zeelenberg & Pieters, 2007; O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney, 2014). Yet, as
demonstrated by the studies reported herein, after a regret experience people may avoid
the previously made decision, even when it is still better than the other alternatives. In
Study 1, participants played two rounds of Blackjack and in the second round almost half
of them switched away from the good decision and selected the non-optimal decision as a
consequence of having received a regret feedback at the end of the previous round. In Study
2, the same pattern emerged even when the second round of Blackjack was substituted
with a different game, thus revealing a carry-over effect of experienced regret also on a
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subsequent situation not directly related to the one that produced regret. Moreover, Study
2 shed light on the mechanism underlying this bias by using a game in which the two
hypothesized mechanisms (direct effect vs. indirect effect) would have led to different
behaviors. Results supported the hypothesis that regret influences subsequent choices by
inhibiting the previous decision (direct effect): If this option becomes available again in a
subsequent decision task, it is less likely to be chosen, regardless of its intrinsic value. We
conversely found no evidence supporting the hypothesis that the effect of regret consists
in priming the anticipation of regret in subsequent choices (indirect effect). This result
is consistent with recent work conducted by Raeva, Van Dijk & Zeelenberg (2011), who
found no evidence of increased regret anticipation after a recent experience of regret, and
by O’Connor, McCormack & Feeney (2014), who found behavioral consequences of regret
in children incapable of anticipating regret.
Overall, it appears that the experience of regret induces a strong tendency to avoid a
decision that had previously led to regret, and that this can occur even when it remains
objectively the best one available. Understanding the reasons people behave this way, aban-
doning a good decision for a non-optimal one after an experience of regret, is theoretically
challenging. We argue that this effect is a bias resulting from the use of what we might call
the “regret heuristic,” a simple strategy that consists in basing actual choice on the outcome
of the previous choice. This strategy could be viewed as a particular instance of the affect
heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000), in which a previous decision is tagged with a negative
affect after having learned, through explicit feedback (as in the present studies), or after
having imagined (by counterfactual thinking), that a different decision would have been
better. This regret-mediated information is highly available, thus the previous outcome can
be used as a heuristic attribute in place of the target attribute, which in this instance is the
option’s likelihood of success (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Kahneman, 2003).
The findings presented in this paper highlight the possibility of the biased consequences
of regret and suggest a new account for these effects under a broader perspective. We do not
claim that this paper represents an exhaustive study, further research is obviously needed to
explore the behavioral consequences of experienced regret and the consistency of the regret
heuristic hypothesis.
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